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Article 9

THE SEC CAN NO LONGER REGULATE FROM
BEHIND
BY JUDGE STANLEY SPORKIN*
Judge Sporkin discusses the future of SEC regulation. He first
examines the successes of the SEC's past regulationpractices when the
SEC was a more proactive agency. Judge Sporkin then argues that
failing to deal with issues before they present themselves often leads to
financial crises which, when they occur, places the SEC in the
untenableposition of trying to put the "toothpaste back into the tube."
Simply put, he asserts that regulators,particularly the SEC, must be
proactive in overseeing the functioning of the financial markets and
their participants. As he puts it, regulators cannot wait and "regulate
from behind. "
It is a real privilege for me to be here to discuss an issue of great
importance to the financial well-being of this country. The SEC is an
extremely important agency. As far as I am concerned, it is one of the
best agencies in all of government. It has an incredible task and
discharges its responsibilities reasonably well. Having said that, it does
not mean the SEC can rest solely on its well-deserved laurels and not
subject itself from time-to-time to critical scrutiny.
As someone who spent twenty years at the agency and truly
admires and believes in its mission, I have always been interested in its
state of well-being. I have, over the years, found it of interest to look at
the agency from both the perspectives of its current agenda and those of
the past.
Working through this exercise, I found some remarkable
distinctions. When I talk about the past, I'm largely referring to the
twenty years that I was at the SEC-the 1960s and 1970s. While

* Judge Stanley Sporkin served as a United States District Court Judge for the District of
Columbia for 14 years. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he spent 20 years with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, including seven years as Director of Enforcement.
Judge Sporkin retired from the bench in 1999, then served as a partner at Weil, Gotschal &
Manges LLP. He was also a founding partner of Freeh, Sporkin, & Sullivan, and now, in
addition to having his own law firm, he serves as the Ombudsman for BP America Inc.
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arguably those years moved at a more modest pace, there are still some
remarkable differences that cannot be attributed solely to the pace of
events.
In those years, the Commission seemed to be more aware of
changes in the industry. The option markets were just coming of
age. The Commission gave them as thorough a review as reasonably
conceivable. In other areas, as well, the Commission seemed to be on
top of industry moves. Some of the most basic and dramatic
developments in the securities field occurred in those years. The
Commission, in the landmark cases of Cady Roberts' and Texas Gulf
Sulphur,2 commenced its war against insider trading abuses, a war that
continues to this day at a high octane level.
Largely as a result of the SEC's initiative, Congress passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 3 as well as important takeover
legislation. It was responsible for the abolishment of fixed commission
rates as then existed in the exchange markets.4 The SEC was creative in
other ways. It came up with the Rule 144 concept that permitted sales
of unregistered securities to leak into the marketplace in a nondisruptive fashion. The Enforcement Division was created, which
allowed the Commission and its staff to be able to more effectively
target and deal with abusive industry practices. The "Wells" process
was introduced, which not only exists today, but also has been copied
by other government agencies.5 Rule 15c2-11 was another important
rule that emerged. 6 This rule rid the marketplace of so-called "numbers
trading," a phenomena that distorted the marketplace by allowing penny
stocks to be traded way out of their normal range. Sometimes worthless
stocks would be traded for twenty, thirty, forty dollars and even more a
1. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd in part,
rev'd in part SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (1975); Adoption of
Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No. 34-11203, 6 SEC Docket
147 (Jan. 23, 1975).
5. KENNETH B. WINER & SAMUEL J. WINER, SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES § 88.10
(2010); SEC. AND ExcH. COMM'N Div. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 22-28

(2012); see also Bradley J. Bondi, The SEC's Wells Process Turns 40, LAw360, Aug. 31,
2012, available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/36/doc/Law-360_The-SEC'sWells-Process-Turns-40.pdf.
6. Initiation or Resumption of Quotations without Specific Information, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c2-11 (2012) (enacted in 1971).
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share.
The internal investigation process arose out of corporations'
need to insure compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as
well as other provisions of the securities laws. The compliance concept,
as we know it today, can trace its origins to the SEC's Enforcement
Program. This occurred largely in response to the SEC's adoption of its
market access strategy.
This move came from the SEC taking aim at the entities that
profited from the unlawful acts of their employees. The strategy was
designed to provide incentive to those organizations that gave access to
the marketplace to police themselves; in effect, the entity itself was to
become the first responder. In response to the SEC's actions against
entities, the private sector developed compliance programs to protect
the organization from being sued by the SEC. This concept caught on
The defense
and spread to even non-SEC-regulated companies.
contractor sector picked up on this internal policing device. This is just
a short list of the many accomplishments that arose out of the agency's
mid-twentieth century adventures.
As we entered into the last part of the twentieth century, there
was a dramatic change. Regulation was heralded as the enemy of free
markets. The Milton Friedman Chicago View emerged with the thesis
that free markets were the best form of regulation. The word "Free
Markets" became the cry of the day. It spooked many of the regulators
who backed away to a certain extent from their responsibilities. I
believe this had some impact on the SEC. I cite the role played by the
then Chairman of the SEC in opposing the then Chair of the CFTC's
desire to regulate derivatives. 7
There is no question that our markets are the best in the world
and that our overall free market philosophy certainly cannot be
questioned with the caveat as mentioned by President Obama in his
Inauguration Speech to the effect that free markets, in order to sustain
themselves, need rules that insure fair competition as well as overall

7. The Chairman of the SEC was Arthur Levitt and the Chair of the CFTC was
Brooksley Born. "They were totally opposed to it," Born says. "'That puzzled me. What was
it that was in this market that had to be hidden?' John Carney, The Warning: Brooksley
Born's Battle with Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, BUSINESS INSIDER,

Oct. 21, 2009, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/the-warning-brooksley-bornsbattle-with-alan-greenspan-robert-rubin-and-larry-summers-2009-10.
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fairness in the marketplace. 8
During this deregulation mood, many changes took place. The
private sector took advantage of this state of affairs and introduced
many innovative changes, some benefited society, and some were
unnecessarily destabilizing. During this period we saw the creation of
credit default swaps, synthetic securities (whatever they are), mortgagebacked securities, high frequency trading, and derivatives of all
kinds. To a certain extent, the regulators were nowhere to be found
until the excesses generated by these new products brought about
adverse consequences in the marketplace. As a result, the cry for more
regulation came from the investing public as well as from the financial
markets themselves. Hearing these cries, Congress responded and
enacted two very encompassing pieces of legislation, namely SarbanesOxley9 and Dodd-Frank. 10
My thesis is that this did not have to happen. During these
periods, when regulation becomes out of favor, the SEC and the other
regulatory agencies must stand their ground. They cannot allow the
industries they regulate to do anything they want, and only stop them
when they have gone so far as to bring about a financial crisis. The
various studies of our most recent financial crises clearly show that the
SEC should have had a more vigorous presence. Certainly, the SEC
took action in some of the more egregious cases. This form of
regulation by exception cannot do it by itself. It needs a robust
regulatory program to partner with it on a real time basis.
Simply put, regulation from behind is a prescription for failure.
We, at this very time, find ourselves ready to be tested
again. There is a new deregulation mood coming into existence. It has,
as its goal, the scaling back of Dodd-Frank and the tearing down of
many of the investor protection measures that were created over the
years that addressed the issuance of new securities of small and
unseasoned companies. Certainly, the new JOBS Act" will put the
8. "[A] free market only thrives when there are rules to ensure competition and fair
play." President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301-08, 116 Stat. 745, 77585 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7241-46).
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641).
11. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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SEC to the test. As a whole, the SEC must become more proactive, and
its various divisions must work much more closely together as they
once did. The agency must recognize it is foremost a regulator, and as
such, it must not over rely on its enforcement arm to bring about
compliance. 12 Putting individuals out of the business or in jail should
not be its only mission. Ideally, foresight should be given as equal a
role as hindsight. While I know it will be difficult, a reoriented
Commission with its highly capable members and staff should be able
to meet the challenge.

12. During my tenure at the SEC, we were faced with a new practice of East Coast
brokers paying their obligations to clients by issuing checks on West Coast banks. The
West Coast brokers engaged in the same practice in order to gain a return on the float to the
detriment of clients who had to wait days to receive the right to use their money. To
eradicate this activity, the Commission could have either proceeded against the misbehaving
brokers on an individual case basis, or it could simply issue a release condemning the
practice. By choosing the latter, the practice immediately ceased. This is how regulation
can obtain the most effective impact for its efforts. There are no statistics to be obtained of
cases brought and nobody was put behind bars. The practice was merely brought to an end.
The so called "quasi-amnesty" program of self-investigation brought in the early stages of
the FCPA is another example of effective, broad-based regulation without individualized
punishment.

